Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: scientists interact with models in ways analogous to various aesthetic objects. Fictionalists follow most other accounts of modeling by taking them to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. In such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such content-all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs. I take these points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. I articulate and defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular uses in particular contexts.
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2-1 Hydraulic line diagram
In the third stage, a computer program selects the optimal pump design given the requirements of the calculations: one which can handle both the minimal and maximal pressures, and those in between. This is, in effect, carried out by comparing the hydraulic curves from step 2 to the performance curves of various pumps. That which most efficiently meets the requirements is selected and ordered.
In short, in pump selection my father interacts with the actual well site at the initial stagedetermining the well draw-down curve. Otherwise, he utilizes proxies: simple, theoretical models, schematic diagrams, imagined content, and geometric curves.
Finally, fictionalists try to answer the model-world question. Scientific models have epistemic powers, they are taken to inform us about the real world-even as they diverge dramatically from being accurate descriptions of it. In virtue of what can they do this?
In the next section I sketch how fictionalists answer the semantic, metaphysical, and modelworld questions, which sets us up for the objections in section 5, and will be important for demonstrating how a tool-based view can accommodate fictionalism in section 6.
Fictionalism about Models
As we saw above, a basic motivation behind fictionalism is a commitment to a concrete as opposed to an abstract (or structural) view of models. To begin, distinguish between a model's content and its vehicle. A model's content is what it expresses. The mass-flow equation, for instance, expresses a relationship between two variables: friction and flow. It tells us that as flow increases, friction increases exponentially. A model's vehicle is the object which 'carries' that content-its medium. A hydraulic line diagram is a vehicle which in part expresses the mass-flow model's content. An abstract view of models claims that a model's content is exhausted by structural or relational features (see, for instance, Suarez 2003 , Giere 1988 , Weisberg 2013 2 . In effect, a model says only mathematical things. According to fictionalists, taking models as abstracta in this sense is too thin: many models do not seem to have mathematical content, or mathematical content alone. This is clear enough in some cases: when my father runs a mental simulation of water running through a pump, or builds a scale model, or sketches a hydraulic line diagram, it is hard to see how we could understand such models as abstracta. They seem to express concrete content. In theoretical cases, too, the content of a model appears to outrun mere structure. The mass-flow equation, for instance, seems to express facts about pipe I'll focus on these, but it's important to note that I intend the objections in the next section to apply to any fictionalist account-or for that matter, any account of modelling generally-which requires a resemblance relation between a model and a target system, and which puts strong enough emphasis on the imagination for successful model uses.
A way into the philosophy of fiction is via notions of fictional truth. In virtue of what is it true, say, that "The Little Prince lived on a very small planet (perhaps B-612) with three volcanoes, two extinct and one active"? Especially, how can it be true when the actual world has never contained a little prince living on a very small planet? The answer is to take the above sentence to refer to some fictional, rather than the actual, world. It could be paraphrased as: "according to Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's story, the Little Prince lived on a very small planet (and so on…)". So, fictions have 'internal' truths: propositions which are true according to the fiction. The challenge is working out where these internal truths come from. One could take fictions to refer to sets of possibilia: "the Little Prince lived on a very small planet" is true just in case, across the set of possible worlds which cohere with what is said in Saint-Exupéry's story, that sentence is true. This has nice semantic features, but is rather problematic metaphysically speaking (see, for instance, Thomasson 1999, chapter 1) . What do we take these possibilia to be? Positing a real, concrete group of physical Princes meeting Saint-Exupéry's description is metaphysically rash. Moreover, presumably the author of the work isn't merely describing possibilia; Saint-Exupéry created his characters.
The trick in the metaphysics of fiction, then, is to capture a notion of 'internal', or 'fictional' truth, while so far as possible limiting one's metaphysical commitments and keeping in tune with the actual practices of creating and consuming literature.
Kendall Walton's approach is to take fictions as games of make-believe (Walton 1990) 5 . Such games are facilitated by props: material objects which, in combination with various 'rules of generation' demand that players imagine certain propositions as true. Children playing lava use material objects-furniture and the floor-as props. According to the game, the floor is 'lava', while the furniture is safe. The claim 'Eloise fell into the lava, she is dead' is true, according to the game of make-believe, just in case Eloise touched the floor. The rules of the game and the props prescribe such an act of imagining. Claims in literary fictions work similarly: the various realizers of Saint-Exupéry's story-books, performances, and so forth-are props which, in combination with some set of rules, demand that people consuming the fiction imagine such-and-such to be the case.
It is important to note that Walton's view involves a special notion of 'representation'.
Contrast a broad sense of representation with Walton's more narrow conception. Broadly speaking, in order to represent, an object must have propositional content. For it to be a representation of another object, that content must be 'about' that object. By contrast, in
Walton's usage, something represents just in case it is a prop in a game of make-believe. This is a narrower usage; for Walton 'represent' is a term of art. The semantic question asks how models represent in the context of fiction, the model-world question asks how models might be about the world. As we'll see, although Walton-style fictionalism provides a compelling answer to the former question in some contexts (but not all), it must be supplemented to answer the latter question. In the next section, I'll complain about both the requirement that models are representational in Walton's sense, and about the supplements that have been attempted to answer the model-world question.
So, Walton's view looks ripe for coopting by those concerned with the metaphysics of models (Levy 2015 , Frigg 2010 and Toon 2012 To see the difference between direct and indirect views, a tripartite distinction first drawn by Ron Giere (1988) will be helpful (see also Godfrey-Smith 2006) . On this picture, we should distinguish between model descriptions, model systems and target systems. The model system is whatever it is that modellers directly examine. It is, in Godfrey-Smith's terms, whatever is "… analyzed, described and argued about…" (2009, 102) in modeling. Answering the metaphysical question involves an account of model systems. Model descriptions specify model systems: they could be a set of equations (perhaps written down, carried in someone's head, or realized on a computer), an image, a material object, or whatever (I assume we can equate a model description with its vehicle). A target system is the part of the world we take the model to be informative of. My father might specify a model system using a mass-flow equation, and take this to inform him about his target system, a pump. Direct fictionalists aim for a cleaner metaphysical plate. Both approaches agree that internal claims about models work according to Walton's machinery. However, they differ on the metaphysics and model-world question. Where indirect fictionalists take a model system to be a game of make-believe, direct fictionalists, in a sense, deny there is a model system at all.
full sentences, it ranges over these sentence parts. A sentence is 'partially true' when at least one of its parts is true. Let's take a fictional example, considering Romeo in act 2 scene 2:
But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the Sun.
The last sentence is, of course, false-even in the fiction: Juliet is a 13 year old human female, not a star. However, we could very roughly understand the sentence as composed of two parts:
"Juliet is at the eastern window" and "Juliet is the sun". Naturally, it loses something in the translation, but I take it that according to Shakespeare's fiction, the former sentence is true and the latter is false. The metaphor, then, could be understood as being partially true in Yablo's sense. Similarly, Levy suggests that we partition the false and true aspects of the model's content in virtue of which it says something true (when it does!) about its target system. On this kind of view, we should take my father's model pump to be a description of the actual pump-perhaps something akin to its blueprints, or a map. Aspects of a map's representational content are true and aspects are false. A map gets it right when it gets it right in the relevant respects. Models are direct, rather than indirect, representations.
The purpose of going into this amount of detail about fictionalist views is two-fold. First, it is important to see that the two objections I provide in section 5 are not solved by the kinds of precisifications attempted by Levy, Frigg, and company. These all turn on there being (1) a moreor-less explicit resemblance relationship between the model (or description) and some target system, and (2) that models-qua-models necessarily demand certain acts of imagining on the modeller's part. On my view, both commitments are problematic in engineering or design contexts. Second, my aim in section 6 is to encompass the successful parts of fictionalism into a broader account, and seeing how this operates requires a firm grounding in varieties of fictionalism.
Fictionalism & Design
In what follows, I do not deny that models are representational in a broad sense: that they are 'about' target systems and function as proxies. Rather, I deny that this aboutness is captured in fictionalist terms. First, both direct and indirect fictionalists answer the model-world question in terms of there being some resemblance between a model and a fixed target system. For Frigg, this is a property-comparison; for Levy, a relation of partial truth. But there are world-directed uses of models where their purpose is to scaffold both further models and the construction of 'target' systems themselves. As such, there seems to be no good target for the property comparison or the truth-relation, and moreover the success of the model explicitly doesn't rely on this. Second, for fictionalists, being a Walton-style representation is essential to modeling. But models are not representational in the same way that fictions are. That is, they are not essentially representational. Stripped of representational content, a literary fiction is no fiction. That is to say, it is plausible that possessing fictional representational content is a necessary condition for something to count as a fiction. However, models may be-in fact often are-stripped of such content. Fictions qua fictions-as opposed to, say, inscriptions, or mistaken non-fictional reports, are always (Walton-style) representations. Models qua models are not. As I'll make explicit, both problem cases arise in the modelling work I described at the paper's beginning.
Philosophers considering models often speak as if, when considering the model-world relation, there are two kinds of models: 'general' models which in some sense lack targets (although see Levy 2015) , and what Weisberg calls 'targeted models' (2013), those concerned with representing a particular system. However, the use of models to scaffold further model construction, and to design and construct physical systems, represent a third class which, I'll now argue, fictionalists cannot account for. in Walton's sense. After all, in such circumstances we only care that the model provides the appropriate output.
In the third stage of pump selection, a pump is picked from amongst the standard options by, effectively, matching the curve generated by the pipe equation to the curve relating to the pressure output of each particular pump. This process is carried out automatically: a piece of computer software matches pump to well. This ensures that a pump is selected which is able to overcome the pressure, flow and friction from the required volumes of water. There is a broad sense in which the pump-curves 'represent' features of the pipe. But they do not do so as fictionalists require. That is, their functioning does not turn on their being props which demand certain imaginings in games of make-believe. It is hard to see how this could be so, given that the matching process is carried out by a computer. Moreover, even if the task was carried out by a human, they wouldn't have to know what they were actually doing-selecting the optimal pump given the requirements of the case-to successfully achieve the task. All they would need to do is match the curves as best they could. Such models could be used as props, but this makes no inprinciple difference to their capacity to perform the task. In short, the model's success doesn't require that it licenses games of make-believe.
One may object that in designing the models we must take them as representational in Walton's sense. That is, designing a model requires that we partake in the relevant game of make-believe (via more-or-less explicitly specifying a set of rules of generation and constructing some prop). Even if this is right, I don't see how the point carries over to the model's function once it is constructed. It might be a necessary condition that, were the model to be taken as a representation in those terms, it would generate the relevant truths. But this is a weak condition:
presumably any object could operate as any number of props in any number of games. Further, one might argue that non-fictional models are not models. This strikes me as unmotivated-my father utilizes a range of proxies to aid his selecting of a real-world pump. These proxies play a variety of roles, some fictional and others not, but all are surely part of the activity of modeling. I imagine that many might be attracted to this last point, since such cases are not viewed as problem cases, but are simply excluded from accounts of modelling. However, such exclusions seem ad hoc. If modeling accounts are supposed to be exhaustive, then we should prefer an account which happily accommodates them.
We can take the case study which opened the paper, then, as involving three kinds of models, delineated in terms of their function. First, preliminary models. In pump selection, models are constructed in stages, preliminary models acting as scaffolds for more detailed, more targeted models. Preliminary models are often used to aid in the imagining of the final product, but are not properly understood in fictionalist terms because their success does not turn on their saying (approximately) true things, or being (approximately) accurate representations, or possessing any other sufficiently detailed resemblance relation with a target system. Their role is to provide a basis to build further models in a dynamic interaction with the target system, and thus they play a crucial role in how the designed object turns out. This is world-directed-the purpose of the model is to build something, after all-but its success in that world-directed function does not turn on its partial truth, or on property comparisons. Preliminary models make trouble for any account which cashes out model-world relations in terms of resemblance (thus including many structuralist accounts).
Second, fictional models. These, like the model which my father uses to determine the required properties of the future pump, do function as the fictionalist would have it. Which is to say, the models act as props which urge games of make-believe by which the model says true things of the future pump.
Third, procedural models-we see these in the final stage, where the optimal pump design is selected. In this context, the model fulfilling its function doesn't require that it be representational. Here, we simply care about its output: by matching the well system curves to pump pressure curves, the right selection is identified. To do so, we do not need to take the well system curves or the pump pressure curves as representing wells or pumps in Walton's sense. We simply need to know that following this procedure will provide the result we need.
The lesson is that-particularly in engineering-there are world-directed uses of models which fictionalists cannot account for 8 .
Models as Tools
In this section I coopt work from the philosophy of artifacts to argue that we should understand models as tools.
The content of a story is determined by the rules of generation and the props. The author controls these via how they design the props (say, the words they write). believe, or as a modified, exaggerated description of the actual well system. However, in other contexts the model might act as a calculating device, or a way of cleaning data, or as a repurposable object, or so on. In these contexts, the model's success turns on the criteria discussed above.
For instance, consider preliminary models. In our case study, these include the simple massflow equation, and the more complex model used to determine Ptmax (the maximal required pressure to get water into the tank). In the last section, I argued that taking these as generating (partially) true statements about the world, or licencing property comparisons, doesn't capture how they tell us about the world. They are world-directed in virtue of being the basis of-a scaffold for-further models. On the tool view, we can understand preliminary models in terms of their function, that is, the relationship between F and the model's F-properties. For preliminary models in engineering, F is the facilitation of the construction of further models which will determine the ultimate properties of what is being designed or selected. The F-properties in question, then, are those features of the model in virtue of which it is a good scaffold. The model determining Ptmax takes into account some of the features which will eventually matter for the pump's construction, such as draw-down amount and the distance from the (assumed) pump discharge point to the floor, however it misses other necessary components such as seasonal well characteristics, atmospheric pressure, etc.… The point of determining Ptmax in isolation of these other factors is in part to simplify the selection process, and to narrow the search space.
The model is a good one insofar as its F-properties (that it takes into account draw-down, but ignores atmospheric pressure, say) facilitate those functions. It doesn't succeed in virtue of representing the pump which is ultimately selected, but by aiding in the construction of models which do, and by enabling an appropriate dynamic relationship with the design and construction processes themselves.
Notice that, on this view, we can happily accommodate fictionalism (and recall that my objection to fictionalism turns on the idea that fictionalism is supposed to be a complete account of modeling!). There are some uses to which we put objects that involve taking them to have representational content. Under such circumstances-when we use a model to explain the behavior of a target system, for instance-the F-properties that matter are those which make for a good representation. In short, what makes for a good prop. Moreover, this is amenable to both direct and indirect views. On an indirect view, we take the model descriptions as props, while on the direct view the target itself plays this role. In either case, they can be conceived of as material objects repurposed as representational tools. The basic features of Walton's account are available. However, tools need not be representational, and so neither do models.
It is time to turn to the metaphysical question.
Models as material objects
Something may have struck you as odd in the last section: I defined 'tools' as material objects, not merely concrete objects, the bearers of non-structural properties, but as material objects. I want to explore taking this quite literally. As we have seen, Levy's deflationary move is to identify the model system with the target system: literally speaking, there is no model system, but rather a description of the target, which emphasizes some aspects over others. In section 4 I argued that this view was problematic for preliminary models: their success does not turn on describing targets, but rather on scaffolding further model construction. The position I want to explore is similarly deflationary, but avoids this kind of objection. I suggest that in some circumstances we should equate the model system with the model's vehicle (or description). It is an open question whether vehicles are necessarily material, but it's worth examining a view which takes them to be. Which is to say, could models be, properly speaking, just the inscription of the equation, or the mental operations and imaginings, or the instantiated software, etc.?
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Many philosophers have emphasized the materiality of models, often while providing similarly pragmatic accounts to mine , Boumans 2012 , Knuuttila 2011 . I don't think incorporating materiality is necessary for capturing modeling practice-fictionalist appeals to 'props', it strikes me, happily accommodate this-however, taking them as material objects is amenable to a deflationary metaphysics about models.
Consider the mass-flow equation. This is realized by many model descriptions: a scribbled inscription, in prose, as an equation, instantiated by computer software, mentally represented, and so forth. By the tool-view, we equate models with vehicles. In each realization, we can understand the model in terms of that material object's (the model description's) behavior. In a computer, various physical components, microchips, processors, etc., undergo particular processes and produce particular behaviors depending on how we program and manipulate them. Pen-and-paper models are perhaps best understood as being coupled with cognitive processing. In solving an equation by hand, the inscriptions and my brain activity interact such that regular behaviors emerge. In each case, it seems coherent to understand the model-the tool in question-as a vehicle, and the vehicle as being a material object.
By this view there is not, metaphysically speaking, a 'model' independent of the model description and target system. There is a vehicle, and there are the functions to which vehicles are put. We equate the model with its vehicle, and take that object as a tool with F-properties relating to the target.
Is equating models with vehicles sufficient to make them material? Not necessarily. I've described tools as material objects: instantiated, complex and boasting spatio-temporal location. This is uncontroversial concerning hammers and sewing needles, and presumably also for physical models-but surely this is an odd thing to say about mathematical models. Here, it might be tempting to draw the notion of a model's vehicle apart from its physical realization, to say that an equation can be represented in many different mediums, but its representational contentthe object which bears that content-is mathematical rather than material or concrete. Deciding whether material or mathematical objects 'bear' mathematical content depends on answers to questions about the nature of mathematical truth, questions which are above my paygrade in this context. Suffice to say, nominalist or anti-realist answers to that question would allow us to identify vehicles with model descriptions, as would views which take mathematical truth to be 'contained' in material objects. Even if we admit abstract vehicles in some mathematical contexts, the tool view still has the advantage of accommodating preliminary and procedural models. There are two related objections I want to cover.
First, the 'models-as-vehicles' view is counterintuitive. Imagine my father scribbles otherwise identical equations on two separate pieces of paper. Surely these are instances of the same model, as opposed to two different models as my account demands. There appears to be differences in how we intuitively treat objects like sewing needles and models-we are keener to distinguish between needle-tokens than we are between model-tokens.
Second, some philosophers take it that a criterion for a successful account of models and modeling is their individuation (see Weisberg 2013 & Frigg 2010 . That is, tell us when two models count as the same model, and when they are different models. On the face of it, this makes trouble for my account: if models are vehicles, then it doesn't seem as if there is a way of unifying them. If I write an equation using paper, or enter it into a computer, surely these are examples of the same model. But on my view this can't be right, as both models have different material constitution: one is made of paper and graphite, the other of silica. Moreover, the individuation of models helps facilitate communication about, and the study of, models-it helps solve epistemic issues.
These objections are too quick, however. Tools are a classic classifiable object. Sewing needles are categorized based on their different points: ball-point needles are ideal for knit fabrics due to do not separating fibres, while regular-point needles are used for woven fabrics.
Restricting ourselves to needles for hand-sewing, various types of needle with various lengths, bendability, sharpness and eye-size are distinguished. These include long, thick, darning needles with large eyes, long thin beading needles, and curved upholstery needles. There is nothing at all mysterious about these classifications: needle-kinds are classified in terms of physical properties and intended purposes. And just the same may be said for models. 
Conclusion
Philosophers concerned with modeling often stress the importance of capturing their use in practice-and indeed modellers do often interact with, discuss, and conceive of their model in fictionalist ways. And so an account of modeling must be sensitive to this. However, I have argued that fictionalism is incomplete: as an overall account of scientific modeling the view is insufficient. It is insufficient because some model purposes are not fictional, which is to say do not involve acting as props in games of make-believe. Instead, we should identify models with their vehicles, (potentially) material objects which are suitable for particular tasks. That is, models are tools. The crucial advantage of the tool-based account, in my view, is its capacity to flexibly account for both fictional and non-fictional models. As such, it provides a better overall picture of the practice.
